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The goal of this paper is to extend the framework of finite size analysis recently developed for
quantum key distribution to continuous-variable protocols. We do not solve this problem completely
here, and we mainly consider the finite size effects on the parameter estimation procedure. Despite
the fact that some questions are left open, we are able to give an estimation of the secret key rate for
protocols which do not contain a postselection procedure. As expected, these results are significantly
more pessimistic than the ones obtained in the asymptotic regime. However, we show that recent
continuous-variable protocols are able to provide fully secure secret keys in the finite size scenario,
over distances larger than 50 km.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic
primitive that allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob,
to generate secret keys despite the presence of a potential
eavesdropper [1]. When, in 1984, Bennett and Brassard
invented the first QKD protocol [2], they could only prove
that their protocol had to be secure in some appropriate
regime (for instance in the unrealistic case where Alice
and Bob’s data are perfectly correlated) but were not
in measure to establish any security proof for a realistic
setup at that time. During the last 25 years, security
proofs have steadily improved and today, unconditional
security, that is, security guaranteed in an information-
theoretical sense has been established for many QKD pro-
tocols [3–6], including continuous-variable protocols [7].
A caveat, however, is that any theoretical security proof
relies on assumptions, which can be more or less explicit.
One such assumption can be for instance that the phys-
ical implementation of the protocol behaves as specified,
and that no side-channels can be exploited by the ad-
versary. This, unfortunately, is in general impossible to
prove [8] unless one considers device-independent quan-
tum cryptography [9, 10], which is certainly a fascinating
theoretical possibility, but highly unpractical. Another
assumption which is often made is that one considers the
security of a protocol in the asymptotic regime of in-
finitely many signals exchanged by Alice and Bob. Here,
on the positive side, the general framework to address the
problem of finite-size effects already exists. The specific
formalism was developed in Renner’s PhD thesis [6] and
subsequently detailed in [11] and applied in [12]. Note
also that another analysis compatible with composable
security was developed by Hayashi in the case of BB84
with decoy states [13] and later applied to experimen-
tal data [14]. On the negative side, the results of these
various papers are quite pessimistic and it is not totally
unreasonable to think that the security of all QKD im-
plementations realized until now was in fact jeopardized
due to the (way) too short length of the blocks exchanged
by Alice and Bob!
So far, the finite-size analysis has been restricted to
discrete-variable protocols, that is, protocols described
with a finite dimensional Hilbert space (see Ref. [15] for
an application to QKD using qudit systems).
On the other hand, continuous-variable protocols
where information is encoded in phase space, appear to
be a credible alternative to historical protocols like BB84.
Indeed, they are relatively easy to implement, requiring
only coherent states generation together with homodyne
detection [16] and now display very good performances
in terms of achievable distance [17–19].
The basic idea of continuous-variable QKD is to en-
code information in phase space. To do so, Alice sends
random coherent states to Bob, who decides randomly
to measure either one of the quadratures with a homo-
dyne detection. (Note that a variant consists for Bob to
perform an heterodyne detection, that is to measure both
quadratures simultaneously [20–22].) After this measure-
ment, Alice and Bob share classical variables x (the value
of the quadrature of the state sent by Alice) and y (Bob’s
measurement result) from which they can in principle
distill a key, once they have exchanged sufficiently many
signals. A few protocols of interest have been proved
unconditionally secure [7], depending on Alice’s modu-
lation which can be either continuous (Gaussian [16] or
eight-dimensional [19] in order to allow for a very effi-
cient reconciliation procedure) or discrete (binary [23] or
quaternary [17, 18]). Note that for all such protocols,
no postselection of the classical data [24] should be per-
2formed, as such a postselection is not compatible with
present security proofs [43].
The goal of the present paper is to give a first finite-
size analysis for continuous-variable QKD protocols. In
Section I, we rapidly review the framework of [11]. In Sec-
tion II, we describe the outline of a general continuous-
variable QKD protocol. Then, we discuss in Section III
the main specificities of continuous-variable protocols in
the context of finite-size analysis. We proceed in Section
IV with a detailed study of the most important finite-
size effect: parameter estimation. Finally, we present
the results of this study in Section V and give some per-
spectives.
I. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINITE
SIZE ANALYSIS
In the following, we note N the total number of sig-
nals exchanged by Alice and Bob during the protocol. We
note x and y the classical data of Alice and Bob, respec-
tively, after they have measured their quantum states,
and E refers to the quantum state of the eavesdropper.
The formalism developed in [6] allows for the following
generalization of the secret-key rate of a discrete-variable
QKD protocol which is secure against collective attacks
[11]:
k =
n
N
(
SǫPE(x|E) −
leakEC
n
−∆(n)
)
. (1)
This key rate has to be compared to the asymptotic key
rate K given by
K = S(x|E)−H(x|y), (2)
and four differences can be noticed.
First, only n signals are used for the establishment of
the key, out of the N signals exchanged. This is due to
the fact that m = N − n signals are used for parameter
estimation. This leads to the presence of the prefactor
n/N in front of the secret key rate. Note that this factor
is not very critical: it would become relevant if a QKD
protocol were to be implemented and commercialized as
it limits the rate of the protocol, but in practice, it has
little effect on the final rate, say a factor 1/2 if 50% of the
data are used for parameter estimation. Indeed, the real
theoretical challenge today is to decide whether a QKD
protocol can be used to distill a secret key for some given
conditions (of losses and noise). From this point of view,
optimizing every possible parameter in order to maximize
the secret key rate seems a little bit premature.
Second, the usual conditional entropy S(x|E) has to
be replaced by the expression SǫPE(x|E) taking into ac-
count the finite precision of the parameter estimation.
Indeed, whereas the quantum channel can be assumed to
be perfectly known in the asymptotic regime, here, this
can only be achieved with a finite precision related to the
probability ǫPE that the true values of the nPE channel
parameters are not inside the confidence region computed
from the parameter estimation procedure. Note there is
never unicity of such a confidence region: one is free to
optimize his choice among all possible regions compati-
ble with the failure probability ǫPE. This choice can be
based on the simplicity of the description of the region
(for instance the Cartesian product of nPE intervals cor-
responding to each estimated parameter), or on an opti-
mization maximizing the final secret key rate, in which
case the confidence region is a very general region in the
nPE-dimensional space of the parameter space. Unfortu-
nately, such an optimization is often rather complicated
to perform, and in general, one chooses confidence re-
gions with very simple shapes (one is referred to Ref.
[25] for a discussion of such considerations in the case
of BB84). There also exists a trade-off between the de-
sired level of precision of the parameter estimation (in
particular, the number nPE of parameters one considers)
and the number m of signals which have to be sacrificed
to this end. For instance, it is known that for BB84,
in the asymptotic regime, a full tomography of the state
increases the secret key rate [26]. This is not necessary
true anymore in a finite-size context. In [12], the authors
suggest that in the limit where N tends to infinity, the
optimal number of samples m used for the parameter es-
timation should be on the order of
√
N . However, for
reasonable values of the block length N , the number of
samples needs to be much larger than
√
N , especially in
the case of continuous-variable protocols.
For BB84, only one parameter needs be estimated in
theory: the quantum bit error rate (QBER). In practice,
however, depending on the implementation, additional
parameters might need being estimated especially if weak
coherent states are sent instead of true single photons, for
instance in the case where the decoy-state technique [27]
is applied. Using Hoeffding’s inequality for instance, one
can find a confidence interval (parameterized by ǫPE) for
the QBER such that the true value of the parameter is
inside the interval with probability at least 1 − ǫPE. In
the case where several parameters must be estimated (for
instance in continuous-variable QKD protocols), the no-
tion of confidence interval should be replaced by a multi-
dimensional confidence region such that the true value
of the parameters lies in the region with a probability at
least 1− ǫPE. Then one needs to compute the minimum
value of the conditional entropy S(x|E) compatible with
the confidence interval: this gives SǫPE(x|E). Whereas
this procedure is relatively straightforward for the QBER
(which is a bounded parameter since 0 ≤ QBER ≤ 1),
we will see in the following that the question is more in-
volved for continuous-variable QKD protocols where one
needs to estimate a priori unbounded parameters such
as the excess noise. In this paper, we will consider two
parameters to be estimated in continuous-variable QKD:
the transmission T and the excess noise ξ. In principle,
these are not the only parameters to be estimated in a
real implementation as one also needs to know Alice’s
modulation variance (as well as the electronic noise and
3the quantum efficiency of the detectors if one considers
a scenario where Bob’s detection is calibrated), but one
can reasonably assume that this parameter is relatively
well known, in comparison to T and ξ.
Third, leakEC corresponds to the amount of informa-
tion which needs to be exchanged by Alice and Bob dur-
ing the reconciliation phase. This quantity is necessarily
equal or larger than the conditional entropy H(x|y), but
in practice, it always turns out out be strictly larger than
the optimal value. We would like to emphasize that the
effect of an imperfect reconciliation, which is parame-
terized by leakEC here, was already taken into account
for the study of continuous-variable QKD through the
so-called reconciliation efficiency β. This reconciliation
efficiency gives the fraction of I(x; y), the mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob’s data, that the legitimate
parties are able to exploit in practice. More precisely, the
size of the (identical) bit strings shared by Alice and Bob
after the reconciliation procedure is nβI(x; y) (the factor
n is a reminder that only n couples of data are processed
for the key distillation, the rest being used for parameter
estimation). This imperfect reconciliation efficiency has
been for a long time the cause of the limited range of CV
QKD protocols (and still is for the protocols involving
a Gaussian modulation). In the case of discrete-variable
QKD protocols, leakEC is typically modeled as:
leakEC ≈ fECH(x|y) + 1
n
log2(2/ǫEC), (3)
where fEC > 1 is a parameter characterizing the recon-
ciliation efficiency (in a slightly different way than β for
continuous-variable reconciliation) and ǫEC is the prob-
ability that the reconciliation fails and that this failure
goes undetected by Alice and Bob [44]. In practice, this
probability can be made arbitrarily small.
Finally, the parameter ∆(n) is related to the security
of the privacy amplification. Its value is given by:
∆(n) ≡ (2dimHX +3)
√
log2(2/ǫ¯)
n
+
2
n
log2(1/ǫPA), (4)
where HX is the Hilbert space corresponding to the vari-
able x used in the raw key, ǫ¯ is a smoothing parameter
and ǫPA is the failure probability of the privacy amplifi-
cation procedure. Both the smoothing parameter ǫ¯ and
ǫPA are intermediate parameters which should be opti-
mized numerically. The first term of ∆(n), that is the
square-root term, actually corresponds to the speed of
convergence of the smooth min-entropy (which is the ap-
propriate measure of the key length) of an independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) state (remember that
we consider collective attacks here) toward the von Neu-
mann entropy. Indeed, only in the asymptotic limit is
the smooth min-entropy of an i.i.d. state equal to its von
Neumann entropy. The second term is directly linked to
the failure probability ǫPA of the privacy amplification
procedure.
Note that if one was to consider general security, it
would be necessary to add to Eq. 1 another correction
term linked to the use of the exponential version of de
Finetti theorem [28], or to the postselection technique
[29] and this would give an even more pessimistic key
rate. However, in the case of BB84 for instance, collec-
tive attacks are optimal, even in the case of finite size
analysis, and such terms are therefore not required. For
CV QKD protocols, it is also conjectured but not yet
proven that collective attacks are always optimal. There-
fore, it makes sense to consider the finite size analysis
when the eavesdropper is restricted to collective attacks.
Without the proof of the optimality of collective attacks,
one could use the bound derived in [7] for the applica-
tion of an exponential version of de Finetti theorem for
infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. However, because
this bound, which is not believed to be tight, leads to
very pessimistic results, we prefer not to take it into ac-
count here, and therefore limit our analysis to the case
of collective attacks.
In the end, one needs to fix an overall security param-
eter ǫ for the quantum key distribution protocol. Indeed,
contrary to the more usual asymptotic scenario, no such
thing as perfect security can exist in a finite-size setting,
and one is limited to ǫ-security. The (small) parame-
ter ǫ corresponds to the failure probability of the whole
protocol, meaning that the protocol is assured to per-
formed as is supposed to except with a probability at
most ǫ. Again, here, we do not consider problems due
to an imperfect implementation, which might lead to the
existence of side-channels that can be used by an eaves-
dropper. The failure probability ǫ can be computed from
the various parameters described above, and in the limit
of small parameters, one has:
ǫ = ǫPE + ǫEC + ǫ¯+ ǫPA. (5)
Note that all parameters ǫEC, ǫ¯, ǫPA and ǫPA can inde-
pendently be fixed at arbitrarily low values (possibly by
increasing the total number N of exchanged signals to a
rather high value):
• ǫPE can be made as low as desired simply by in-
creasing the size of the sample used for parameter
estimation (and therefore not used for establishing
a key).
• ǫEC can be decreased with the following procedure:
Alice and Bob simply need to compute a hash of
their respective bit strings after the reconciliation
and to publicly compare it. This method is very
interesting because computing a hash acts like an
error amplification: even if the original strings only
differ for a few bits out of several millions, their
hash will be different with a very high probability.
Hence Alice and Bob can check that they share a
common bit-string while sacrificing only a negligi-
ble quantity of data.
• ǫ¯ and ǫPA are virtual parameters that can be opti-
mized in the computation. They must simply sat-
isfy both equalities 4 and 5.
4As a consequence, the overall security parameter ǫ can
be chosen arbitrarily small, to a value corresponding to
Alice and Bob’s wishes. Obviously, this comes at the cost
of decreasing the final secret key size.
II. OUTLINE OF A CV QKD PROTOCOL IN A
FINITE SIZE CONTEXT
Traditionally, in the asymptotic regime, one can make
the assumption that the quantum channel is perfectly
known, before the transmission is even performed. Hence
the optimization of the various free parameters can be
made before the exchange of data, and the final secret
key rate can be in principle known in advance (as long
as the quantum channel behaves as anticipated).
In the finite-size scenario, the situation is quite differ-
ent. In particular, one does not know in advance the char-
acteristics of the quantum channel. To be fair, even after
the exchange of quantum signals, the quantum channel
is only partially known: more precisely, a few relevant
parameters (QBER for qubit channels, transmission and
excess noise for continuous-variable channels) are known
to lie inside some confidence regions, except with proba-
bility ǫPE.
Even if Alice and Bob do not know in advance the
properties of the quantum channel they will use, they
can guess them with a reasonable accuracy, making the
assumption that no eavesdropper will actually try to con-
trol the quantum channel. Note that this guess is only
used in order to a priori optimize various parameters
of the protocols and consequently maximize the expected
secret key rate, under a “normal use” of the quantum
channel. If an eavesdropper is present, the guess made
by Alice and Bob might not be very good, hence leading
to an non optimized use of the quantum channel, but the
security of the key distribution will not be affected.
For a continuous-variable QKD protocol, the secret
key rate depends (in the asymptotic limit) on three main
physical parameters: Alice’s modulation variance VA, the
transmission of the channel T and the excess noise ξ
which corresponds to the noise on Bob’s state in excess
compared to the shot noise. The idea is to optimize VA
in order to maximize the expected secret key rate. To
do that, Alice and Bob can guess the values of T and ξ.
The transmission can be evaluated quite precisely with
T ≈ η10−0.02d where η is the known quantum efficiency
of Bob’s detection and d is the distance in kilometers be-
tween Alice and Bob. Here, we assume an optical fiber
with losses of 0.2dB per kilometer. In practice, Alice and
Bob generally have a good estimate of the value of the
transmission of the quantum channel before they start
the quantum key distribution protocol. The value of ξ,
on the other hand, depends on the quality of the setup
and turns out to be fairly stable from one experimen-
tal run of the QKD protocol to the next. Typically, for
state-of-the-art implementations, its value is around 1%
of the shot noise [30]. Note that this corresponds to the
expected value of the excess noise. As we will see later,
the measured value might differ significanty from the the-
oretical value due to a high statistical noise.
At the beginning of the protocol, Alice and Bob agree
on a particular value of the overall security parameter
ǫ. They also agree on a reconciliation protocol, mean-
ing that they know the parameter ǫEC in advance. Since
both ǫ¯ and ǫPA are virtual parameters that have to be
optimized afterwards, the rest of the initial (that is be-
fore the quantum distribution) optimization consists in
studying the parameter ǫPE which quantifies the failure
probability of the parameter estimation. This parameter
depends on the number m = N − n of samples used for
this parameter estimation as well as on some properties
of the quantum channels such as the expected true values
of the parameters T and ξ. Therefore, given the expected
behavior of the quantum channel, one can infer the value
of m required to obtain a particular value of the param-
eter ǫPE. This in turn puts a lower bound on the block
size N necessary to obtain a ǫ-secure secret key.
At this point, still before the actual start of the quan-
tum key distribution protocol, Alice and Bob can op-
timize the values of the total number N of signal ex-
changed, the length of the raw key n as well as the opti-
mal value for Alice’s modulation variance VA in order to
maximize the expected secret key rate compatible with
the overall security parameter ǫ. The values of N , n and
VA can be considered to be fixed at this stage.
Then, Alice and Bob proceed with the quantum ex-
change part of the QKD protocol: Alice sends N ran-
dom coherent states (or N/2 for protocols with hetero-
dyne detection) according to the modulation character-
izing the protocol (with a modulation variance VA) who
measures them with a homodyne (or heterodyne) detec-
tion. Bob informs Alice of his measurement choices (that
is, for each state, Bob tells Alice whether he measured
the X or the P quadrature, or both) and Alice discards
the data that Bob did not measure. They publicly dis-
close N − n of their correlated data in order to estimate
the true values of the transmission and excess noise of
the quantum channel. They can therefore compute the
value of SǫPE(y|E), the conditional von Neumann entropy
of Bob’s data (which will be used to form the key in
a reverse reconciliation procedure) given Eve’s quantum
state, which is compatible with the estimated parameters
except with probability ǫPE. If this value is compatible
with a positive secret key rate, Alice and Bob continue
with the reconciliation procedure, otherwise they abort
the protocol. At the end of the reconciliation procedure,
Alice and Bob compute the hash of their respective bit
strings (for some well chosen hash function, that is, a
randomly chosen hash function from a family such that
the equality of both hashes guarantees that the recon-
ciliation procedure worked except with probability ǫEC
[45]). If their strings differ (because their hashes differ),
Alice and Bob abort the protocol. (Note, however, that
Alice and Bob might try to continue with the protocol by
exchanging more classical information in order to com-
5plete the reconciliation procedure.) If their hashes are
identical, Alice and Bob compute the final key size com-
patible with the security parameter ǫ (by optimizing over
ǫ¯ and ǫPA) and perform the privacy amplification, that is,
they randomly pick a hash function from a two-universal
family of hash functions which outputs a string of length
l, with l = kN the size of the ǫ-secure secret key that
they can extract from their data.
III. VARIOUS ISSUES SPECIFIC TO
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
First of all, we would like to emphasize once again
that we are only considering here collective attacks and
not general attacks. This decision can be motivated by
the fact that the optimality of collective attacks has been
proven asymptotically and that it is conjectured that this
optimality could hold in a finite-size setting. Moreover,
the correction terms computed in [7] are quite large and
likely not tight and might hide interesting effects (such
as the dependence of the key rate on parameter estima-
tion) behind purely technical details such as (temporary
?) bounds linked to a particular mathematical proof (ex-
ponential version of de Finetti theorem for infinite di-
mensional Hilbert spaces).
A. Dimensionality
The main difference between discrete-variable and
continuous-variable QKD protocols is obviously the in-
finite dimensionality of the Hilbert space required to de-
scribe CV QKD protocols. This is in general rather prob-
lematic when studying the security of CV QKD but it
becomes even more annoying when one considers finite
size effects. In particular, when one is only interested
in asymptotic key rates, the dimension problem can be
solved by saying that in the end, everything in the exper-
iment is discrete (even the homodyne detection since the
local oscillator has a finite energy). Therefore, one can
always theoretically bound the dimension of the relevant
Hilbert space by a number large enough and prove that
the correction terms due to this large dimension all go to
zero in the asymptotic limit.
Unfortunately, for a finite-size scenario, such an ap-
proach fails as the convergence toward the asymptotic
rate can be heavily slowed for high dimension. For in-
stance the finite dimension corresponding to the digital-
ization is often on the order of d = 212 = 4096 if one uses
12-bit analog-to-digital converters. If one compares such
a system with a two-dimensional one, equation (4) tells
us that the same ∆(n) is attained for a n ∝ d2, i.e. for a
value of n 1.4 · 106 times higher in the high-dimensional
case. The magnitude of such factors clearly shows that
bounding the dimensionality of the system by a finite
value is not enough for ensuring its security in practical
circumstances. This dimension should also be as small
as possible, and it is important to come up with security
proofs that are as dimension-independent as possible.
Fortunately, in some continuous variable protocols [17,
19, 31], the raw key is encoded on bits, and this allows
us to take dimHY = 2 for the numerical evaluation of
the section V.
When this is not possible, one should be able to replace
the real dimension of the system by its effective dimen-
sion, but this remains essentially an open question.
Such an effective dimension is generally much smaller
than the real dimension and is sufficient to capture the
relevant features of the continuous-variable system. Dif-
ferent definitions for this effective dimension can be pro-
posed. Generally however, one defines the effective di-
mension deff1 of a mixed system ρ as:
deff1 (ρ) ≡
1
trρ2
, (6)
which quantifies the number of states over which ρ is
spread [32]. For instance, a totally mixed state over N
orthogonal states has deff1 = N . A more speculative vari-
ant would be to remember that according to [33], the
proper max-entropy Hmax of a state is not given by the
Re´nyi entropy of order 0 (which diverges for any quan-
tum state of a CV system) but by the Re´nyi entropy of
order 1/2. Therefore one could also define the effective
dimension deff2 as the exponential of this entropy, that is
deff2 (ρ) ≡ (tr
√
ρ)2. (7)
The advantage of the first definition is that it relates
to the energy of the state, and that it is automatically
bounded, for any (physical) state ρ.
In order to be rigorous, the above effective dimension
defined above will probably be defined under the form of
“smooth dimensions”, depending on a small parameter
ǫ, in a way similar to the smooth-entropies introduced in
[34], which have allowed to look at the finite-size effect.
In any case, it is intuitively clear that ultimately, it is
such effective dimensions that should appear in security
proofs of CV QKD protocols. This question certainly
needs to be investigated further. We stress again that
such a problem, which is rather benign in the asymptotic
limit, plays a crucial role in a finite-size analysis.
B. Ill-defined entropies for continuous variables
Another specificity of CV QKD is that classical en-
tropies are ill-defined for continuous variables: the Shan-
non entropy has to be replaced by a differential entropy,
which is not a practical quantity to analyze secret key
rates. For this reason, the expression
SǫPE(y|E)−
leakEC
n
(8)
is inadequate for CV QKD. The solution is to rewrite
the different quantities in terms of mutual information
6instead of relative entropies. Hence, the previous expres-
sion can be replaced by
βI(x : y)− SǫPE(y : E) (9)
in the case of a CV protocol. Here βI(x : y) gives the
amount of mutual information Alice and Bob were ef-
fectively capable to extract through the reconciliation
phase: β is the reconciliation efficiency which ranges
from 0 when no information was extracted to 1 for a per-
fect reconciliation scheme. While SǫPE(y|E) is defined as
the minimum conditional entropy compatible with the
statistics given by the parameter estimation except with
probability ǫPE, SǫPE(y : E) is naturally defined as the
maximum of the Holevo information compatible with the
statistics except with probability ǫPE. Hence, in the case
of a continuous-variable QKD protocol, the secret key
rate obtained for a finite size analysis reads:
k =
n
N
(βI(x : y)− SǫPE(y : E)−∆(n)) . (10)
C. Reconciliation efficiency
Whereas the question of error-correction was never a
crucial issue for DV protocols where it just implied a
small correction term, the same is not true for CV proto-
cols without postselection. For these schemes, Alice and
Bob need to be able to extract their mutual informa-
tion very efficiently. The absence of efficient reconcilia-
tion protocols working in the low Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNR) regime was, for a long time, the reason why CV
protocols could not distribute secret keys as far as their
DV counterparts. To be more precise, a reconciliation
protocol is considered efficient if β is larger than roughly
80%. For such efficiencies, the correction term appears
quite negligible and has a limited impact on the QKD
protocol. For a Gaussian modulation, the best known
protocols achieve efficiencies higher than 80 % only for
SNR larger than 1 [31, 35, 36]. For lower SNR (relevant
to increase the range of the protocol), no good proto-
col is known for the reconciliation of correlated Gaussian
variables. Fortunately, this problem can be solved in this
regime by switching to a discrete modulation where ef-
ficient protocols are available for all SNR lower than 1
[17].
To summarize, both modulation schemes (Gaussian
and discrete) are useful depending on the working dis-
tance of the protocol. When working at short distances, a
Gaussian modulation should be chosen whereas a discrete
modulation is more adapted to reach longer distances. In
both cases, the effect of imperfect reconciliation can be
taken care of by taking β = 0.8 which is a conserva-
tive value consistent with state of the art reconciliation
schemes. Note that one can make the best of both worlds
(continuous and discrete modulation) by using a specific
eight-dimensional continuous modulation (see Ref. [19]
for a detailed presentation of such a protocol).
IV. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
For discrete-variable QKD protocols, it turns out that
the principal finite-size effect, in terms of its consequences
on the secret key rate, is the parameter estimation [12].
A similar situation is expected for continuous-variable
protocols, the main problem being without any doubt,
the estimation of the excess noise ξ.
In this section, we study the parameter estimation pro-
cedure for continuous-variable protocols, without post-
selection. Quite fortunately, despite being described in
an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, these protocols dis-
play only a few parameters that need to be estimated:
these are the parameters characterizing the covariance
matrix of the state shared by Alice and Bob in the
entanglement-based version of the protocol [37]. On the
positive side, this covariance matrix can be symmetrized
through a technique similar to the one explained in [38],
and this symmetrized version is described by only two
unknown parameters (in addition to Alice’s modulation
variance). On the negative side, in order to be able to
estimate the two relevant parameters, it seems that one
still has to make the assumption of a Gaussian channel.
This does not look as a very constraining assumption as
it is known that Alice and Bob can always assume their
state to be Gaussian (see [17]). However, this result has
only been established in the asymptotic limit, and one
cannot yet rigorously exclude the (improbable) situation
where this result does not hold in general.
A non-Gaussian attack that would exploit such a pos-
sible loophole would have to be quite subtle. Indeed, the
usual security proof stating that Gaussian states are the
ones which minimize the secret key rate cannot be used
here because the proof implicitly assumes the knowledge
of the covariance matrix. For a given covariance matrix,
the state maximizing Eve’s information is Gaussian. The
only possible loophole would be that because the covari-
ance matrix is not perfectly known in a finite-size sce-
nario, there might exist a non-Gaussian state, compatible
with the estimated covariance matrix computed with a
Gaussian assumption, that would be better for Eve than
the Gaussian state estimated by Alice and Bob. Let us
detail things a little. Let us note SgǫPE the set of states
compatible with the results of the parameter estimation,
under a Gaussian model, except with probability ǫPE.
Let us note SngǫPE the set of states compatible with the re-
sults of the parameter estimation, under a general, non-
Gaussian model, except with probability ǫPE. It is not
easy to compare the two sets a priori, but one can imag-
ine that they likely get closer and closer as ǫPE goes to
0 (we typically consider ǫPE = 10
−10). In the following,
because we make the Gaussian assumption, we consider
the Gaussian state ρg ∈ SgǫPE which maximizes Eve’s in-
formation (note that SgǫPE is not composed of Gaussian
states only, but we know that the worst case from Alice
and Bob’s point of view is Gaussian). However, it is not
yet possible to exclude the existence of a non-Gaussian
state ρng ∈ SngǫPE such that the secret key rate obtained
7for ρng is strictly lower that the one obtained for ρg. This
is however quite unlikely.
For this reason, we conjecture that the Gaussian op-
timality still holds in a non-asymptotic scenario, and in
the following, we make the assumption of a Gaussian
channel. Again we insist on the point that even if this
conjecture were proven wrong, the bounds computed here
would still be quite accurate.
Note, however, that this conjecture was recently estab-
lished in the case of protocols with a Gaussian modula-
tion [39].
Our goal, here, is to compute SǫPE(y : E), the maximal
value of the Holevo information between Eve and Bob’s
classical variable compatible with the statistics except
with probability ǫPE. The nice property of CV protocols
without postselection is that S(y : E) can be bounded
from above by a function of two parameters only. More
precisely, this function depends on the covariance matrix
ΓAB of the state ρAB shared by Alice and Bob in the
entanglement-based version of the protocol (see [39–41]
for protocols with a Gaussian modulation and [17, 18] for
protocols with a discrete modulation). One can always
assume that ΓAB take the following form:
Γ =
(
(VA + 1)12
√
TZσz√
TZσz (TVA + 1 + Tξ)12
)
, (11)
where VA is the variance of Alice’s modulation in the
prepare and measure scheme and T and ξ refer to the ex-
perimentally estimated effective transmission and excess
noise of the channel [38]. The parameter Z is a function
of VA which depends on the modulation scheme. For in-
stance, one has: ZGauss =
√
V 2A + 2VA in the case of a
Gaussian modulation. For a discrete modulation, Z has
a more complicated expression but turns out to be al-
most equal to ZGauss for small variances (see [17]): for
the two-state protocol, one has
Z2 = VA
1 + e−2VA√
1− e−2VA , (12)
and for the four-state protocol, one has
Z4 = VA
(
λ
3/2
0
λ
1/2
1
+
λ
3/2
1
λ
1/2
2
+
λ
3/2
2
λ
1/2
3
+
λ
3/2
3
λ
1/2
0
)
, (13)
where{
λ0,2 =
1
2e
−VA/2 (cosh(VA/2)± cos(VA/2))
λ1,3 =
1
2e
−VA/2 (sinh(VA/2)± sin(VA/2)) . (14)
Finally, for the continuous eight-dimensional modulation
[19], one has:
Z8 =
1
2
e−2VA
∞∑
k=0
√
k + 4
k!
V
k+ 1
2
A . (15)
These various parameters are related through:
Z2 < Z4 < Z8 < Zg. (16)
In order to compute SǫPE(y : E), one simply needs to
evaluate ΓǫPE , the covariance matrix compatible with the
data except with probability ǫPE which maximizes the
Holevo information between Eve and Bob’s classical data.
The estimation of ΓǫPE is made through the sampling of
m ≡ N − n couples of correlated variables (xi, yi)i=1···m.
As we said before, we consider here a normal model for
these variables. Within this model, Alice and Bob’s data
are linked through the following relation [46]:
y = tx+ z (17)
which is a normal linear model parametrized by t =√
T ∈ R and where z follows a centered normal distri-
bution with unknown variance σ2 = 1+Tξ. The random
variable x can be either a normal random variable with
variance VA in the case of the CV QKD protocol with a
Gaussian modulation, or an unbiased Bernoulli random
variable taking values ±√VA in the case of the two- and
four-state protocols (and a similar situation occurs for
the continuous eight-dimensional modulation). At this
point, it is worth considering the dependence of S(y : E)
in the variables t and σ2. One can in particular check
numerically that the following inequalities hold for any
value of the modulation variance VA and for all modula-
tion schemes considered here:
∂S(y : E)
∂t
∣∣∣∣
σ2
< 0 and
∂S(y : E)
∂σ2
∣∣∣∣
t
> 0. (18)
This means that one can find the covariance matrix ΓǫPE
which minimizes the secret key rate with a probability at
least 1− ǫPE:
ΓǫPE =
(
(VA + 1)12 tminZσz
tminZσz (t
2
minVA + σ
2
max)12
)
, (19)
where tmin and σ
2
max correspond respectively to the min-
imal value of t and the maximal value of σ2 compatible
with the sampled data, except with probability ǫPE/2.
Note that this means that the confidence region we con-
sider here is simply a two-dimensional rectangle. One
could obviously study more complicated regions that
might slightly improve the final key rate. However, here,
we prefer to restrict ourselves to this simpler solution
which has the advantage of displaying the same features
as a more complicated model, but without drowning
them under too technical mathematical details.
Maximum-Likelihood estimators tˆ and σˆ2 are known
for the normal linear model [42]:
tˆ =
∑m
i=1 xiyi∑m
i=1 x
2
i
and σˆ2 =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(yi − tˆxi)2. (20)
Moreover, tˆ and σˆ2 are independent estimators with the
following distributions:
tˆ ∼ N
(
t,
σ2∑m
i=1 x
2
i
)
and
mσˆ2
σ2
∼ χ2(m− 1), (21)
8where t and σ2 are the true values of the parameters.
This allows us to compute tmin, a lower bound for t, and
σ2max, an upper bound for σ
2 in the limit of large m [47]:
 tmin ≈ tˆ− zǫPE/2
√
σˆ2
mVA
σ2max ≈ σˆ2 + zǫPE/2 σˆ
2
√
2√
m
(22)
where zǫPE/2 is such that (1− erf(zǫPE/2/
√
2)/2 = ǫPE/2
and erf is the error function defined as
erf(x) =
2√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (23)
In a given experiment, one can simply compute the
values of both estimators tˆ and σˆ2 and plug them in the
Eq. 22 in order to get the values of tmin and σ
2
max and
finally the value of SǫPE(y : E). In order to keep analyz-
ing the protocol from a theoretical point of view, we take
for tˆ and σˆ2 their expected values:
E[tˆ] =
√
T ,
E[σˆ2] = 1 + Tξ.
(24)
Using these values, one can compute tmin and σ
2
max:
 tmin ≈
√
T − zǫPE/2
√
1+Tξ
mVA
σ2max ≈ 1 + Tξ + zǫPE/2 (1+Tξ)
√
2√
m
.
(25)
Finally, one gets the covariance matrix ΓǫPE which
should be used to compute the expected secret key rate
SǫPE(y : E) in the finite case:
E[ΓǫPE ] = Γ +
(
0 ∆Zσz
∆Zσz ∆B12
)
, (26)
with{
∆Z = −zǫPE/2
√
1+Tξ
mVA
∆B =
zǫPE/2√
m
((1 + Tξ)
√
2− 2√TVA) + z2ǫPE/2 1+Tξm .
At the first order, for long distances, the main effect is
clearly the uncertainty on the excess noise. The effective
excess noise ∆mξ due to the imprecision of the estimation
is given by:
∆m ξ ≈
zǫPE/2
√
2
T
√
m
. (27)
We will display in the next section the effect of the pa-
rameter estimation on the secret key rate, but we can
already give a hint about the block length that will gen-
erally be required for a given distance. Indeed, from Eq.
27, one immediately obtains:
m ≈
2z2ǫPE/2
T 2∆mξ2
. (28)
For ǫPE = 10
−10, one has zǫPE/2 ≈ 6.5, and if one requires
∆mξ ≈ 1/100, which is a typical value for the true excess
noise [30], then the number of samples required scales as
a function of the transmission as
m ∝ 10
6
T 2
. (29)
For instance, if the distance between Alice and Bob is 50
km, then T = 10−1 which means that one expects the
block length to be on the order of 108, which is barely
realistic. If the distance is 100 km, then the block length
should be on the order of 1010, which is much more com-
plicated. We will see in Section V that the reality is even
worse than that.
Before proceeding with the numerical results, we now
discuss two technical points linked to the problem of pa-
rameter estimation. First, we come back on the assump-
tion made previously that in a typical experiment, the
value of the estimators will roughly correspond to the
true value of the parameter. Then, we hint on alternative
approaches to improve the estimation of the parameters
for CV QKD protocols, which might be more economical
in terms of the number of samples required, but whose
mathematical analysis is much more involved.
1. Expected secret key rate or most probable secret key rate.
For a given experiment, the secret key rate can be
computed and is a function of the observed values of
the estimators tˆ and σˆ2 (but not only). One can write
kexp = f(tˆ, σˆ
2). ¿From a theoretical point of view, that
is, without performing the actual experiment, there are
two different secret key rates that can be computed.
The first possibility, considered for instance in [12],
is to compute the secret key rate k1 obtained for the
expected values of the parameters:
k1 ≡ f(E[tˆ],E[σˆ2]). (30)
In some sense, this corresponds to what one could call
the most probable secret key rate. This interpretation,
however, is not correct.
The correct theoretical secret key rate k2 is given by
the expected value of the secret key rate, that is
k2 ≡ E[f(tˆ, σˆ2)]. (31)
Obviously, this value is much more difficult to evaluate
in general as one needs to know the probability distribu-
tions of both estimators tˆ and σˆ2, whereas in the case of
k1, one just needs to know the expected values. Fortu-
nately, we will see in Section V that in fact both values
are remarkably close, meaning that one can always safely
use k1 as the secret key size.
2. More economical parameter estimation procedures.
An interesting characteristics of continuous-variable
QKD protocols is that it might be possible to per-
form the parameter estimation without sacrificing any
9data. This is obviously something impossible in discrete-
variable QKD where estimating the quantum bit error
rate (QBER) requires for Alice and Bob to disclose part
of their data.
In continuous-variable QKD however, the bit used for
the raw key is encoded in only a part of Bob’s classical
data. Let us take the example of the four-state protocol
for instance [17]. In this case, Bob’s data {yi}1≤i≤N are
real numbers and the raw key elements are simply given
by the sign of the variables yi. The absolute value is
sent to Alice through the public, authenticated channel,
and Alice uses it to perform the reverse reconciliation
procedure.
In the parameter estimation procedure that we de-
scribed above, Alice and Bob would agree on a certain
subset of their data and completely disclose their data
in this subset. This means that the absolute values of
the rest of Bob’s data are not used for this parameter
estimation, whereas it manifestly contains information
concerning the covariance matrix of the state shared by
Alice and Bob. One could certainly use this informa-
tion to improve the accuracy of the parameter estima-
tion, or equivalently, obtain the same accuracy while us-
ing less samples, therefore increasing the final secret key
rate. However, the statistics techniques necessary for this
study are beyond the scope of this paper, and we do not
address this question more extensively here.
Before concluding this section, we give another possible
way to improve upon the parameter procedure presented
here. For continuous-variable QKD protocols, it is clear
that the critical parameter to estimate is the excess noise.
The transmission on the other hand is less critical for
two reasons: first, it can be estimated more precisely
than the excess noise with the same amount of data (in
particular, the relative uncertainty for the transmission
is smaller than the one for the excess noise), and second,
the secret key rate is much more sensitive to variations
in the excess noise than in the transmission. Therefore,
one could use the following method in order to estimate
the transmission and the parameters:
• the transmission is estimated through the same pro-
cedure as before, with m samples,
• Bob uses the totality of his data to compute an
estimation of the variance of his data. Then using
the relation 〈y2〉 = 1+TVA+Tξ and his estimation
of T , Bob infers an estimation for the excess noise.
This approach seems better than the one studied above.
However, it involves computing two dependent estimators
and the probability distributions of the estimators (nec-
essary to compute confidence regions) are not known.
Therefore, in this paper, we use a likely suboptimal
procedure to perform the parameter estimation, but this
procedure allows for the computation of explicit bounds.
The question of what is the best parameter estimation
procedure in the case of continuous-variable QKD is still
open, and is certainly worth investigating further, as it
turns out that the parameter estimation is an important
problem if one wants to distribute secret keys over long
distance, while using realistic block lengths.
V. RESULTS
Before we discuss the results in terms of secret key rate,
we start by considering the specific influence of ∆(n),
related to privacy amplification and defined in eq. (4).
We then study the influence of the parameter estimation.
A. Influence of ∆(n)
On Figure 1, we plot the value of the parameter ∆(n)
as a function of n, the size of the raw key. Here, we take
dimHY = 2 since for all continuous-variable protocols
we consider, the raw key is encoded on bits [17, 19, 31].
Among notable features, one sees that the value of ∆(n)
does not critically depend on the parameters ǫ¯ and ǫPA
which need to be optimized in theory. One can easily see
from the curve, that for the plotted domain (n ≥ 104),
∆(n) is essentially determined by the first term of eq. (4),
δ(n) ≃ 7
√
log2(2/ǫ¯)
n
(32)
The important lesson is the large value of ∆(n), even for
104 106 108 1010 1012 1014
n
10-5
10-4
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
D
Figure 1: (Color online.) Parameter ∆(n) as a function of
n for various values of ǫ¯ and ǫPA. From top to bottom, ǫ¯ =
ǫPA = 10
−6, 10−7, 10−8, 10−9, 10−10.
(seemingly) quite large sizes of the raw key. In particular,
one observes that ∆(n) is larger than 0.01 for raw key
sizes smaller than 107. In practice, this means that if the
asymptotic secret key rate is below 0.01 bit per channel
use, then if one wants to take into account finite-size
effects, one has to use block lengths larger than 10 million
in order to be able to claim to have truly distributed a
secret key among distance parties.
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B. Influence of the parameter estimation
Here, we focus on the value of the effective excess noise
∆mξ due to the finite precision of the parameter estima-
tion. On Figure 2, we display this effective excess noise
as a function of m, the number of samples used in the
parameter estimation. From Figure 2, it is clear that
106 108 1010 1012 1014
m
10-5
10-4
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
DΞ
Figure 2: (Color online.) Parameter ∆mξ as a function of m
for ǫPE = 10
−10 (in fact, ∆mξ does not depend too critically
on the precise value of ǫPE, and one obtains almost similar
plots for ǫPE = 10
−5 for instance). From bottom to top,
we consider channel losses of 5 dB, 10 dB, 15 dB and 20 dB.
With a perfect homodyne detection (quantum efficiency equal
to 1), this is equivalent to distances of 25, 50, 75 and 100 km,
respectively.
the parameter estimation has a major impact on the fi-
nal secret key rate. Indeed, the four-state protocol for
instance, which can achieve remarkably long distances
in the asymptotic limit, requires very low values of the
excess noise, typically less than one percent in order to
distribute key over distances close to 100 km. Here, we
see that such parameters require to sample 10 billion cou-
ples of correlated data! For this reason, it is doubtful that
continuous-variable QKD is very practical over distances
much larger than 100 km, at least with the security proofs
presently available. Note that a similar situation is also
true for discrete-variable protocols.
C. Secret key rate in the finite-size scenario
Here, we first consider the secret key rate k1 which is
the one obtained if the estimators t¯ and σ¯2 are equal to
their expected values. We do not proceed to a complete
optimization of the various parameters since it will not
fundamentally change the results and instead take the
following values:

ǫEC = ǫ¯ = ǫPA = ǫPE = 10
−10,
ǫ ≈ 10−10,
m = n = N/2,
β = 80,%
η = 0.6.
(33)
The choice for ǫ is a very conservative choice, but it turns
out that the secret key rate does not depend very criti-
cally on ǫ (a similar observation was made in [11]). The
choice to use half of the data for the parameter esti-
mation procedure results from the fact that the block
size is almost entirely decided by the number of data ac-
tually sampled. The reconciliation efficiency of 80% is
a conservative value [17, 31]. Finally, we consider the
quantum efficiency of the homodyne detection to be 60%
which corresponds to a typical experimental parameter
[30]. Moreover, we consider the paranoid mode where
the electronic noise is null. Remember that two different
models can be considered when discussing the security of
CV QKD: either the electronic noise of Bob’s detection
is considered as regular excess noise (paranoid mode), or
it is attributed to Bob’s detection (realistic mode). The
second case is more natural, but it implies that Bob’s
detection stage should be calibrated. As a first approx-
imation, the paranoid mode without electronic noise is
equivalent (in the asymptotic regime) to the case of a
realistic mode where the electronic noise is non negligi-
ble but is not supposed to be caused by the action of
an eavesdropper. In the finite-size regime, one can still
make the assumption that Bob’s detection is very well
calibrated and that there is virtually no uncertainty on
the value of the electronic noise. As a consequence, in or-
der to avoid too many technical details, we present here
results obtained in the paranoid scenario without elec-
tronic noise. Note that this solution was also chosen in
the review by Scarani et al [1].
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
10-6
10-5
10-4
0.001
0.01
distance @kmD
K
Figure 3: (Color online.) Secret key rate for the four-state
protocol. From left to right, the curves correspond respec-
tively to block lengths of N = 108, 1010, 1012 and 1014. Full
lines, dashed lines and dotted lines correspond respectively
to an expected value of the excess noise of 0.001 (optimistic),
0.005 (realistic), 0.01 (conservative). The secret key rate is
null for a block length of 106.
The secret key rates displayed on Figure 3 correspond
to the key rate one can expect if the estimators give the
true value of the parameters. As we argued above, a
more relevant secret key rate corresponds to the expected
value computed for the probability distributions of the
estimators tˆ and σˆ2.
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As we already explained, the most important parame-
ter for the final secret key rate is the excess noise. This
means that one should mainly consider the probability
distribution of the estimator σˆ2. According to Equation
21, one has:
mσˆ2
σ2
∼ χ2(m− 1). (34)
For large m, the χ2 distribution tends to a normal dis-
tribution, which translates into
σˆ2 ∼ N
(
σ2,
2σ4
m
)
, (35)
where, as before, σ2 corresponds to the true value of the
parameter. Here, we can therefore compute an approxi-
mate value of the expected secret key rate k2 as
k2 = E[f(tˆ, σˆ
2)] ≈ E[f(t, σˆ2)] (36)
since tˆ has a probability distribution peaked around the
true value of the parameter t and because f does not
depend critically on the value of t. Using the normality
of the random variable σˆ2, one obtains
k2 =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2σ2
√
m
π
exp
(
−m (s− σ
2)2
4σ4
)
f(t, s)ds. (37)
It turns out that the behavior of k2 is numerically in-
distinguishable from the value of k1. For this reason, we
do not display it here. The main consequence is that one
can in very good approximation compute the final key
rate by considering the expected values of the parameters
being estimated. This is rather fortunate as computing
k2 is much more demanding from a computing point of
view than computing k1.
Finally, on Fig. 4, we display the results for the re-
cently proposed eight-dimension protocol described in de-
tail in ref. [19], which outperforms the four-state protocol
in realistic cases, and may also be easier to implement.
VI. PERSPECTIVES
This article laid down the basis of finite-size analysis of
continuous-variable QKD protocols, but several problems
remain open, and should be addressed in further studies.
First, a basic tool used in the asymptotic regime is
the Gaussian optimality theorem [40, 41], which remain
valid for collective attacks, even in the case of the pro-
tocols which do not use a Gaussian modulation, that is,
the protocols designed to perform well over long distance
[17, 19]. Whereas using this theorem is completely legit-
imate in the asymptotic regime [40, 41], it is not so clear
in a finite-size scenario, where very subtle (and highly
improbable) attacks might perform slightly better. Such
attacks would have to be based on the idea of fooling Al-
ice and Bob by having them make wrong assumptions in
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Figure 4: (Color online.) Secret key rate for the four-state
(thin curves) and eight-dimension (thick curves) protocols ob-
tained for an expected realistic value of the excess noise of
0.005, and for ǫPE = 10
−10. From left to right, the block
length N is equal to 108, 1010, 1012 and 1014. The secret key
rate is null for a block length of 106. The eight-dimension
protocol is better for all curves.
the parameter estimation procedure. This subtle point
(given that the blocks have anyway to be very large) de-
serves further analysis.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, one should
prove whether or not collective attacks are optimal in
the finite-size setting. If this is the case, then all is for
the best, and the bounds derived here are accurate. But
if collective attacks are not optimal, then one needs to
come up with bounds as tight as possible for coherent
attacks. On this subject, it would seem that adapting
the postselection technique from [29] to continuous vari-
ables (using for instance symmetries in phase space as
explained in [38]) would lead to much tighter bounds that
the one currently available through an exponential ver-
sion of de Finetti theorem for infinite dimensional Hilbert
spaces [7].
Despite the fact that there are still open problems
concerning the finite size analysis of continuous-variable
quantum key distribution, some lessons can already be
learned. First, it should be emphasized again that the
problem of the reconciliation efficiency at low SNR is es-
sentially solved by new protocols using discrete modula-
tion and high-efficiency reconciliation codes, such as the
four-state [17] or eight-dimension [19] protocols. Then, as
is the case for discrete-variable QKD protocols, the most
important remaining finite-size effect is the limited accu-
racy of the parameter estimation. For CVQKD, the main
issue is the value of the channel excess noise, which has
already a critical effect for values as small as 1% of shot
noise. Nevertheless, operating windows do exist, pro-
vided that both the “real” excess noise is very small, and
the block size is very large. Under such circumstances,
secure key distribution over distances larger than 50 km
seem quite feasible, especially with the eight-dimension
protocol [19] , as it has been shown on Fig. 4.
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